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Introduction
Nearly two decades ago emotional intelligence entered the scene
of psychological inquiry and since then it has increasingly gained a
place in the scientific community. Emotional Intelligence (EI) can
be defined as the capacity to recognize emotions in oneself and
others, understand how they originate, develop, and change
during emotional experience, and use this understanding to
enhance thinking and behavior. Two conceptually different
approaches have been developed to study EI: the trait and the
ability approach [1]. The first conceives EI as a dispositional
tendency, such as a personality trait, and measures the construct
with self-report questionnaires; the second conceptualizes EI as an
ability based on the processing of emotion information and
assesses it with performance tests. This article concerns the latter
approach of EI; more specifically, it presents a contribution
regarding the most well-known and employed test to measure EI
as an ability: The Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence
Test or MSCEIT [2].
The ability EI approach was introduced in its original
formulation by Salovey and Mayer [3]. It received encouraging
feedback throughout the years [4] and was considered worth
pursuing even by skeptics of the EI concept (e.g. [5]). Although the
ability approach shows promise, several issues still remain
unsettled. Research has yet to demonstrate the extent to which
ability EI is distinct from other existing constructs - such as
personality and general intelligence - and how it accounts for
emotionally intelligent performance. For instance, the personality
trait of agreeableness predicted a substantial amount of variance in
EI scales (e.g. [6,7]).
Furthermore, several studies failed to find an association
between ability EI scales and emotion information processing,
showing that current measures of EI may be tapping into just one
aspect of intelligence, namely crystallized intelligence [8,9,10].
A fundamental issue that has not received adequate attention
from EI scholars refers to better understanding what aspect of EI
current ability tests measure and with what level of accuracy. In
fact, there is scarcity of tests measuring EI as a form of intelligence.
The Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test
(MSCEIT) is among the very few available and the most well-
known and accepted measure of EI as an ability. Thus, conclusions
about EI as a meaningful construct and of its utility in predicting
various outcomes mostly rely on the properties of this test. Hence,
discerning whether a test of EI can be trusted, and to what extent,
is of primary importance for advancing research in this domain.
We aimed to provide a contribution on the quality of ability EI
tests by analyzing the MSCEIT from a perspective that is relatively
new to the domain of EI: the Item Response Theory (IRT). We
opted for such an approach because it allows for investigating the
properties of this test at the item level and because it provides a
different evaluation of the test than classical test theory (CTT). For
instance, CTT assumes that the measurement precision of a test
remains constant along the underlying latent trait. With IRT we
aimed to test whether this assumption holds true for the MSCEIT
along the different trait levels so as to understand whether this test
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is a good tool for discriminating individuals along the ability EI
trait, especially those placed at the higher end of the distribution.
Measuring EI as an Ability
Ability EI tests differ greatly from self-report measures of EI
because they are based on the analysis of how individuals perform
at their best in certain conditions (maximal performance) instead
of assessing how individuals perform on a daily basis (typical
performance). Furthermore, in ability EI tests, correctness of
responses is not evaluated by the subject him/herself, as it is the
case for personality questionnaires, but it is determined on the
basis of an external criterion of correctness. The issue of how to
establish a correct answer in the domain of emotional intelligence
has been (and still remains) the most difficult conundrum to
address. Among the most problematic aspect there is how to
determine the one best way of using/feeling emotions across
individuals, given that individuals may differ with respect to how
they feel and manage emotions effectively. Furthermore, correct-
ness of emotional reactions may depend on the frame of reference
for judging a response as correct. For example, suppressing anger
when receiving a negative feedback from the supervisor may be an
effective way to manage emotions if the goal of the person is to
preserve a good relationship with the boss. However, it may not be
considered as an effective reaction if the criterion is to maintain
self-esteem and reduce frustration.
How did the authors of the EI test address the issue of scoring
the test with respect to an allegedly correct response? Appealing to
the idea that emotions are biologically determined (and therefore
also shared by all human beings) Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey [11]
proposed to score a correct answer according to the response
chosen by the majority of people. For example, if a person chooses
an answer that was also chosen by 75% of the respondents, then
that person obtains a score of.75. The problem residing in the logic
of this scoring system appears particularly evident when answers
are easy to endorse. In fact, in the case of an easy to endorse
answer, most people will get the highest score for a question that is,
in fact, easy (i.e. most people identify the correct answer).
Furthermore, as noted by MacCann and colleagues [12], if the
test is internally consistent and reliable, then the majority of people
who score high on an item tend to score high also on other items,
especially when items are on average rather easy. The result is that
the distribution of the test scores tends to be skewed toward the
high end of the distribution, with average and above average EI
individuals constituting the peak of the distribution.
Notably, the authors of the MSCEIT also proposed a second
scoring system: the expert-based scoring. In this case the correct
answer is identified according to the responses provided by the
majority of a pool of emotion experts. Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey
[11] encouraged using the consensus-based instead of the expert-
based scoring because considered more reliable. In any case, the
expert scoring does not seem to provide an alternative to the
skewedness issue in that, as indicated by the test authors,
correlation between the two scoring systems are as high as.99,
showing that the experts’ opinion does not diverge much from that
of the majority of people, as also recognized by the authors
themselves [13].
The concerns previously expressed on the scoring systems of the
MSCEIT motivated the current analysis. We decided to investi-
gate the MSCEIT at the item level to check how appropriate they
are to measure EI and to discriminate individuals along the EI
trait. In particular, we employed latent trait models and analyzed
individuals’ responses to items in relation to the properties of the
items as well as the position of the individual along the latent trait.
Importantly, with Item Response Theory we were able to
understand whether the precision of the MSCEIT changed along
the latent trait, challenging the assumption of Classical Test
Theory that this precision remains constant.
The MSCEIT
The Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test was the
first test introduced to measure EI as an ability. Since its very first
appearance in 2000 (the test at that time was called Multifactor
Emotional Intelligence Scale or MEIS) the MSCEIT has
undergone several revisions. The current structure of the test
reflects the four-branch model of EI of Mayer and Salovey [14]
according to which EI is arranged in a hierarchical structure with
one global underlying factor, EI, and 4 abilities or branches:
Perceiving Emotions, Using Emotions to Facilitate Thinking,
Understanding Emotions, and Managing Emotions. In addition to
the theoretical model, the test also includes an intermediate level
in which the first two branches are merged into an Experiential
Area score and the second two branches into a Strategic Area
score. Notably, the authors have recommended using the global
score of the MSCEIT in view of the fact that the test measures
‘‘one unique source of variation’’ ([15] p.508).
In addition, each branch is measured through two subscales:
Perceiving Emotions includes identifying emotions conveyed
through facial expressions and abstract pictures; Using Emotions
includes items referring to evaluating how certain moods may
facilitate thinking processes and the comparison of emotions to
sensations, such as color, light, and temperature; Understanding
Emotions includes two subscales that refer to blending emotions
and acknowledging how emotions may change and develop;
Managing Emotions includes two subscales that refer to rating
which emotional strategy would be most appropriate to manage
emotions for oneself and with respect to using emotions in
interpersonal relationships. All the 141 items included in the test
are answered through a Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all
present/not at all effective) to 5 (very much present/effective). The
MSCEIT was presented as a valid measure of EI [16,17,18]
although some doubts about its validity were raised in the past (e.g.
Figure 1. Example of Category Response Curve for the three
scoring options employed in the current analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098827.g001
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[19]) and have become more compelling in recent years (e.g.
[6,9,20,21]).
An IRT Approach to the MSCEIT
Item Response Theory denotes a set of mathematical models in
which the probability of endorsing a certain response to an item is
modeled as a function of the characteristics of the item as well as
the respondent’s position along the latent trait. Whereas Classical
Test Theory (CTT) has the whole test as the unit of analysis, IRT
models provide a way of measuring the quality of a test by
analyzing single items, looking into how appropriate they are for
discriminating respondents, and testing how well such items
measure respondents’ underlying ability/trait. Another important
advantage of IRT over CTT is that it may measure the precision
of a scale without assuming that it remains constant along the
underlying latent trait.
IRT applications to the domain of EI are rather scarce. Cooper
and Petrides [22] employed IRT to assess the psychometric
properties of the short form of the trait EI test (TEIQue-SF; [23]).
The questionnaire showed good precision in discriminating
individuals along the trait and high information values for most
items. Regarding ability EI, Maul [24] conducted an item analysis
of the MSCEIT to investigate the hypothesized structure of the
test. He found no strong evidence for preferring a unidimensional
model over a four-dimensional model of EI when controlling for
facet-related variance. Importantly, no research to date has
employed IRT to understand whether the MSCEIT can be
trusted as an ability test that discriminates among individuals along
the EI trait.
To conduct the analysis we chose unidimensional models of the
Rasch family, which assume that items have an equal relationship
with the underlying trait and estimate for all items a common
discrimination parameter. The simplest Rasch model is the one-
parameter logistic (1PL) model in which the probability P of
endorsing a correct answer is calculated as a function of the latent
trait theta (h) and the characteristic of the item i, such that for each
person j: Pij (hj, bi). More specifically, in this model the b
parameter denotes the item difficulty, which corresponds to the
point on the latent trait in which the person has 50% chance of
responding correctly to the question. We preferred Rasch models
because of their parsimony: they are relatively simple models and
appeared to fit the data rather well. Furthermore, we used a partial
credit Rasch model because the MSCEIT has multiple answers
that are scored along a continuum from the most to the least
correct answer.
Figure 1 depicts item responses through three probability
curves: the red curve corresponds to the probability of choosing
the wrong response, coded as 0; the green curve corresponds to the
probability of choosing a partially correct answer, coded as 1; the
blue curve corresponds to the probability of choosing the most
correct answer, coded as 2. When the ability of the subject is low,
then the most likely answer is a wrong answer (on the left side of
the graph, the red curve prevails). When the ability of the subject is
average, then it is more likely that the person will chose a partially
correct answer (the central part of the graph is mostly taken by the
green line). When the ability of the subject is high, then it is very
likely that the person will provide the most correct answer (the
right part of the graph is mostly occupied by the blue line).
To explore whether items are equally good at distinguishing
individuals on the latent trait, we calculated the item information
function (IIF), which indicates the amount of information yielded
by each item. This feature of IRT is particularly helpful to
determine the precision of measurement of individuals at different
levels of the underlying trait. For most models, the amount of
information provided by each item is maximized when the
difficulty of the item approaches the latent trait of the person.
Because item information calculated according to the Rasch
model tends to be the same for all items given the constraint of
equal discrimination, to calculate IIF we decided to employ a more
complex model. We therefore conducted IFF analyses with a 2 PL
model in which we allowed item discrimination to vary from item
to item.
In addition to estimating the item parameters, we also estimated
respondents’ ability using a Bayesian procedure. For each subject
we estimated the theta distribution apriori. Then we summarized
this distribution a posteriori through its mean. Bock and Mislevy
[25] proposed a way to calculate the aposteriori expectation of
theta based on a apriori distribution obtained from the data. They
called the estimation resulting from this procedure estimation EAP
Figure 2. Factorial structure of the MSCEIT’s sub dimensions and results of McDonald’s omega.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098827.g002
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(expected a posteriori). For most of the analyses we employed the
software ConQuest [26] that estimates the latent trait using
marginal maximum likelihood estimation (MMLE) in which item
parameters are treated as fixed effects and ability parameters as
random effects. Model fit was tested with residual-based methods
developed by Wu [27]. To calculate additional functions, such as
the Item Information Function, we also employed the package ltm
[28].
Method
Participants and Procedure
The sample consisted of 729 participants from the French
speaking part of Belgium; 408 were women and 321 men. The
mean age was 33.29 years (SD=12.55). The sample included 152
undergraduate students who were enrolled in psychological
courses. The other participants consisted of student’s acquain-
tances. They were recruited by asking students to have the
MSCEIT completed by friends and relatives in the framework of a
course assignment.
Ethics Statement
Participation in the study was voluntary and participants could
quit the study at any time they wished. The IRB approval was not
required at the time the study was conducted.
Measure
We employed the French version of the Mayer, Salovey, and
Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) version 2.0, which
was filled out online. The test assesses EI with 141 items that are
organized in 4 characteristics or ‘Branches’: Perceiving Emotions,
which is measured through 2 subscales (sections A and E) referring
to identifying emotions conveyed through facial expressions and
pictures; Using Emotions, which includes 2 subscales (sections B
and F) that refer to how emotions may be employed in different
situations and how they may be associated with sensations, such as
hot/cold; Understanding Emotions, which includes 2 subscales
(sections C and G) referring to understanding the results of
combinations of emotions and knowing how emotions may change
and develop; Managing Emotions, which includes 2 subscales
(section D and H) referred to rating which emotional strategy
would be most effective for regulating the self and other people’s
emotions. For each item participants indicated the level of
effectiveness of a list of options, ranging from 1= very ineffective
to 5= very effective, or the presence of a certain emotion, ranging
from 1=not at all present to 5= present to a great extent. Correct
answers were scored according to agreement with expert opinion.
The test internal consistency reliability (split-half), as indicated in
the manual, is r = .93 [29].
Results
Descriptive Statistics
We conducted a first analysis on the distribution of responses for
each item. The Shapiro-Wilk test showed that all the 141 items of
the MSCEIT have a significantly skewed distribution. Interesting-
ly, for the two sections of Branch 1 Perceiving Emotions, the most
common answer was 1, which corresponds to absence of any
emotion (the Likert scale goes from 1=not at all present to
5 =present to a great extent). More specifically, response 1 was the
most common answer for 15 out of 20 items of section A, and for
28 out of 30 items for section E. This implies that for this branch of
the test (Perceiving Emotions) individuals obtain the highest score
for, ironically, detecting the presence of ‘no emotions’.
Taking the raw score of each item, we calculated the correlation
between the scoring of experts (expert scoring) and that based on
the majority of respondents (consensus scoring). For 12 out of 141
items the correlation was either negative or close to 0, showing that
experts and common people chose different correct answers on
those few items. For 97/141 items the correlation was higher than
.90. If taken at the level of the sub-dimensions and branches,
correlations between the two scoring systems ranged between .94
Figure 3. The person’s score on the same metric of the item difficulty for the two sections (C and G) of Branch 3, Perceiving
Emotions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098827.g003
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and .99. These results show that the two systems provide very
similar results and that the issue of the skewedness of responses is
common to both scoring systems.
IRT Analysis
We recoded answers chosen by the majority of experts as ‘2’,
answers that were close to the one chosen by the majority of
experts as ‘1’, and all other answers as ‘0’. For example, if 4 was
the answer chosen by the majority of people, then the score of 4
was recoded as ‘2’, the score of 5 and 3 were recoded as ‘1’, and
the score of 1 and 2 were recoded as ‘0’. We employed this coding
system to reduce the scoring options from 5 to 3 while maintaining
the level of complexity of a partial credit approach.
We calculated scores on the 8 MSCEIT’s sub-dimensions based
on the recoded answers (theta scores); then we calculated
McDonald’s omega [30] to estimate the general factor saturation
of the test and to check for the unidimensionality requirement of
IRT. McDonald’s omega describes the ratio of the variance due to
Figure 4. Location of the persons and the items on the same latent trait for the two sections of Branch 4-Managing Emotions:
section D (left) and section H (right). Each ‘X’ represents 4.7 cases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098827.g004
MSCEIT and IRT
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a common factor to the total variance. Results shows that a
general factor explains 55% of the variance, and that introducing
3 intermediate factors to the model adds up 23% of variance.
Although the latter model is better, the former still appears to fit
the data rather well (see Figure 2).
Parameter-level fit statistics, in particular the infit and outfit
mean squares, were investigated. These indexes provide informa-
tion regarding the extent to which the data fit the model. Values
are expected to be close to 1; values lower than 1 indicate model
redundancy, whereas values higher than 1 indicate that the model
is under predicted. Fit indexes did not show any particular misfit
for most items, with the exception of 12 items with unsatisfactory
parameters, mainly in the two sections of Branch 1, Perceiving
Emotions (see Table 1 for the list of problematic items; results of all
items are available upon request). Overall results suggest that our
model predicts data quite well.
The person-parameter distribution. Figure 3 plots the
person’s score on the same metric of the item difficulty. As an
example, we report scores of the 2 sections of Branch 3
Understanding Emotions (results for all the MSCEIT sections
showed the same pattern of Branch 3 and are available upon
request). In the figure, the point marked as 1 corresponds to the
point in which the probability of responding 0 is equal to the
probability of responding 1. The point marked as 2 corresponds to
the point in which the probability of responding 1 is equal to the
probability of responding 2. When the point marked as 1 is left of
point marked as 2, then it means that the most likely answer is the
intermediate answer (or answer coded as 1). In contrast, when the
point marked as 2 is left of point 1, then it means that the
intermediate answer is very unlikely to occur, and that the item
functions as if it were dichotomous. Most items show the latter
pattern.
The person-item map. Figure 4 shows the location of the
estimated level of the person (left side, represented by the symbol
X) and the items’ difficulty (right side) on the same latent trait for
the two sections of Branch 4, Managing Emotions (results for the
other sections of the MSCEIT present a similar patter and are
available upon request). Both higher ability individuals and more
difficult items are located on the upper side, whereas low ability
and low difficulty on the lower side of the vertical line. The most
evident result of this comparison is that the distribution of the
persons is shifted with respect to the distribution of the items. This
may be interpreted as if items are not difficult enough to challenge
high ability individuals. The same pattern emerged across the
different sections of the MSCEIT and is more evident in the data
represented in Figure 5 as box-and-whisker plot. Here the bold
line inside the boxes indicates the median, and the upper and
lower limit of each box respectively the upper and lower quartile.
The graph also shows the maximum and minimum score and the
Figure 5. Comparison of how items and individuals are positioned on the same latent trait in the eight sections of the MSCEIT.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098827.g005
MSCEIT and IRT
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location of outliers, indicated by the small points at the very end of
the distribution.
The item information function. We calculated the amount
of information provided by each item with the Item Information
Function (IIF). The sum of the item response functions of a scale
provides the test information function: Ij (hj) =Si Iij (hj, bi). As
previously discussed, to calculate this function we employed a
more complex model in which we let the item discrimination vary
from item to item. Results are shown in table 2. The percentage
indicated in the table is calculated within each subsection,
therefore items of subsections with more items (ex. Section E)
are on average less informative than items of a subsection with
fewer items (ex. Section H). Ideally each subsection should be
balanced in terms of how much each item contributes to the total
information of that subsection. And yet, in Section H there are two
items (H8 and H9) that provide less than 1% of information.
Overall items appear very heterogeneous: 12.7% of the items
provide less than 1% of information, whereas 14.2% provides
more than 10% of information. The information provided by each
item can be summed up and plotted to describe each branch’s
information function (Figure 6). From the graphs it is clear that the
MSCEIT provides the most information for levels of the latent
trait that are lower than 1 SD below the mean.
Discussion
The purpose of the current analysis was to understand the
extent to which the MSCEIT can be trusted as a measure of
individual differences in EI. Results of the IRT analysis revealed
that the test items are rather heterogeneous in the amount of
information provided, and that the four branches seem to be better
suited to discriminate individuals at the low end of the EI trait.
More specifically, whereas individuals at the low levels of the trait
of EI provided different answers depending on the level of the
trait, individuals at the mean and high level of the trait provided
the same answers to items regardless of whether they were higher
or lower on EI.
How to Use The MSCEIT In EI Research
The fact that this test does not seem to have strong
measurement precision for distinguishing average from high EI
individuals poses some limitations regarding how it should be
employed for practice and research. Regarding its use for research,
scholars employing this test should take into consideration the fact
that the MSCEIT may not provide reliable results when employed
with individuals that are supposed to cover the whole range of EI
scores. In fact, in such cases the test would fail to detect differences
among individuals that score average and above average, say on
perceiving emotions, using emotions, understanding emotions, and
managing emotions, providing similar scores for individuals that in
fact are not on the same level of EI.
With respect to the use of the MSCEIT in applied settings, our
analysis shows that this test would be appropriate for testing
clinical subsamples that are expected to be below average on EI,
but not for testing the normal population. MSCEIT users that
employ the test for recruitment and personnel assessment should
consider that this test may be effective to detect individuals with
low EI, but it may not accurately discriminate average from above
average individuals.
Figure 6. The Information Curve for each MSCEIT branches.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098827.g006
MSCEIT and IRT
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e98827
T
a
b
le
2
.
A
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
p
ro
vi
d
e
d
b
y
e
ac
h
it
e
m
as
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
w
it
h
th
e
It
e
m
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Fu
n
ct
io
n
.
B
1
-P
e
rc
e
iv
in
g
E
m
o
ti
o
n
s
B
2
-U
si
n
g
E
m
o
ti
o
n
s
B
3
-U
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
E
m
o
ti
o
n
s
B
4
-M
a
n
a
g
in
g
E
m
o
ti
o
n
s
it
e
m
in
fo
in
fo
%
it
e
m
in
fo
in
fo
%
it
e
m
in
fo
in
fo
%
it
e
m
in
fo
in
fo
%
it
e
m
in
fo
in
fo
%
it
e
m
in
fo
in
fo
%
it
e
m
in
fo
in
fo
%
it
e
m
in
fo
in
fo
%
A
1
0
.9
0
4
2
.3
5
E1
0
.0
0
2
0
B
1
2
.1
0
8
1
4
.7
7
F1
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
9
C
1
0
.6
0
9
4
.7
5
G
1
1
.5
0
2
1
3
.2
6
D
1
2
.2
9
1
6
.0
6
H
1
2
.0
9
1
1
8
.6
8
A
2
2
.1
9
8
5
.7
E2
1
.1
8
7
2
.2
7
B
2
1
.9
3
9
1
3
.5
9
F2
1
.2
3
9
7
.2
1
C
2
0
.7
0
2
5
.4
7
G
2
0
.7
4
2
6
.5
5
D
2
1
.7
6
1
1
2
.3
5
H
2
1
.1
2
8
1
0
.0
8
A
3
2
.4
9
7
6
.4
8
E3
1
.6
0
7
3
.0
8
B
3
0
.3
3
3
2
.3
3
F3
3
.0
5
5
1
7
.7
8
C
3
0
.1
9
2
1
.5
G
3
0
.2
0
9
1
.8
4
D
3
1
.0
2
3
7
.1
8
H
3
1
.5
2
3
1
3
.6
1
A
4
2
.1
0
1
5
.4
5
E4
2
.4
0
4
4
.6
1
B
4
0
.3
1
1
2
.1
8
F4
0
.0
1
9
0
.1
1
C
4
0
.5
7
8
4
.5
1
G
4
1
.0
5
1
9
.2
7
D
4
0
.2
9
2
.0
4
H
4
0
.9
2
4
8
.2
5
A
5
2
.1
5
1
5
.5
8
E5
2
.2
2
7
4
.2
7
B
5
0
.2
7
4
1
.9
2
F5
1
.0
1
8
5
.9
3
C
5
0
.2
0
1
1
.5
7
G
5
0
.3
9
4
3
.4
7
D
5
0
.3
8
6
2
.7
1
H
5
2
.2
3
8
2
0
A
6
0
.9
8
1
2
.5
4
E6
0
.7
1
5
1
.3
7
B
6
1
.4
0
8
9
.8
7
F6
1
.7
2
8
1
0
.0
6
C
6
0
.3
1
7
2
.4
7
G
6
1
.0
9
7
9
.6
8
D
6
0
.0
5
2
0
.3
6
H
6
2
.2
5
2
2
0
.1
2
A
7
0
.6
3
1
.6
3
E7
2
.1
6
9
4
.1
6
B
7
1
.1
9
1
8
.3
5
F7
0
.2
5
1
1
.4
6
C
7
0
.0
2
9
0
.2
3
G
7
0
.8
7
6
7
.7
4
D
7
0
.2
6
1
1
.8
3
H
7
0
.9
7
5
8
.7
1
A
8
2
.0
0
2
5
.1
9
E8
1
.4
4
9
2
.7
8
B
8
1
.5
1
8
1
0
.6
4
F8
0
.6
6
9
3
.9
C
8
0
.7
6
6
5
.9
7
G
8
0
.8
7
4
7
.7
1
D
8
0
.9
6
8
6
.7
9
H
8
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
1
A
9
2
.8
9
2
7
.5
E9
2
.5
7
5
4
.9
4
B
9
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
6
F9
1
.8
3
4
1
0
.6
7
C
9
0
.6
1
4
4
.7
9
G
9
0
.5
9
1
5
.2
2
D
9
0
.9
1
8
6
.4
4
H
9
0
.0
6
1
0
.5
4
A
1
0
2
.6
7
5
6
.9
4
E1
0
1
.4
6
8
2
.8
1
B
1
0
0
.0
6
2
0
.4
3
F1
0
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
C
1
0
0
.4
0
8
3
.1
8
G
1
0
0
.6
2
3
5
.5
D
1
0
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
3
A
1
1
1
.1
2
7
2
.9
2
E1
1
0
.6
9
8
1
.3
4
B
1
1
1
.4
6
6
1
0
.2
8
F1
1
0
0
C
1
1
0
.0
3
8
0
.2
9
G
1
1
1
.9
5
3
1
7
.2
4
D
1
1
0
.9
9
3
6
.9
6
A
1
2
0
.3
3
6
0
.8
7
E1
2
2
.5
6
4
4
.9
1
B
1
2
1
.3
5
4
9
.4
9
F1
2
1
.6
0
9
9
.3
7
C
1
2
0
.5
2
2
4
.0
7
G
1
2
1
.4
1
7
1
2
.5
1
D
1
2
0
.0
2
0
.1
4
A
1
3
1
.6
2
1
4
.2
1
E1
3
3
.0
0
7
5
.7
6
B
1
3
0
.6
9
7
4
.8
9
F1
3
0
.3
8
6
2
.2
5
C
1
3
0
.7
3
5
5
.7
3
D
1
3
0
.1
2
1
0
.8
5
A
1
4
2
.6
3
1
6
.8
2
E1
4
2
.1
1
7
4
.0
6
B
1
4
0
.5
0
5
3
.5
4
F1
4
3
.9
1
1
2
2
.7
7
C
1
4
1
.2
6
7
9
.8
8
D
1
4
1
.2
6
5
8
.8
7
A
1
5
2
.7
9
5
7
.2
5
E1
5
2
.7
8
2
5
.3
3
B
1
5
1
.0
9
6
7
.6
8
F1
5
1
.4
4
8
.3
8
C
1
5
1
.5
1
8
1
1
.8
4
D
1
5
0
.0
9
7
0
.6
8
A
1
6
0
.1
6
1
0
.4
2
E1
6
2
.0
6
6
3
.9
6
C
1
6
0
.5
2
2
4
.0
7
D
1
6
0
.9
1
6
6
.4
2
A
1
7
1
.7
8
2
4
.6
2
E1
7
2
.2
4
8
4
.3
1
C
1
7
0
.6
9
3
5
.4
D
1
7
1
.6
0
8
1
1
.2
8
A
1
8
2
.8
6
7
.4
2
E1
8
1
.0
6
8
2
.0
5
C
1
8
1
.2
6
9
9
.8
9
D
1
8
0
.5
0
8
3
.5
6
A
1
9
3
.1
5
7
8
.1
9
E1
9
1
.2
7
9
2
.4
5
C
1
9
0
.6
5
8
5
.1
3
D
1
9
0
.1
8
1
1
.2
7
A
2
0
3
.0
5
7
.9
1
E2
0
2
.3
4
.4
1
C
2
0
1
.1
8
7
9
.2
5
D
2
0
0
.5
9
7
4
.1
8
E2
1
0
.8
0
4
1
.5
4
E2
2
2
.1
7
6
4
.1
7
E2
3
2
.2
7
3
4
.3
6
E2
4
1
.7
6
9
3
.3
9
E2
5
1
.5
4
4
2
.9
6
E2
6
0
.9
9
1
1
.9
E2
7
0
.8
8
2
1
.6
9
E2
8
2
.1
5
6
4
.1
3
E2
9
1
.5
7
6
3
.0
2
E3
0
2
.0
8
1
3
.9
9
d
o
i:1
0
.1
3
7
1
/j
o
u
rn
al
.p
o
n
e
.0
0
9
8
8
2
7
.t
0
0
2
MSCEIT and IRT
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e98827
How to Improve the Current Version of the MSCEIT
Our analysis revealed that certain aspects of the MSCEIT could
definitely be improved in a revised version. The item information
function (IIF) showed that about 13% of the items included in the
test provide less than 1% of information. Of note, the MSCEIT
manual on p. 63 states that 19 items present in the test are
excluded from the test scoring. We asked MHS the list of these
items: 8 correspond to items that provide less than 1% of
information. Eleven items could still be removed because of the
low information they convey. Given the length of the test, these
items could be simply removed without impacting on the
psychometric properties of the test.
Our analysis shows that several items function as dichotomous
rather than as items with different nuances of response. In
addition, because most individuals identified the most correct
answer, the different degrees of correctness were seldom endorsed,
showing that the test items are overall rather easy. Consequently,
as a second recommendation we suggest to improve the current
version of the test by either scoring responses as correct or wrong,
or by introducing response options that would guarantee more
endorsement by test takers so as to capture nuances among
individuals that possess different levels of the latent trait.
A final recommendation regarding how to improve the test does
not derive directly from the results of the IRT analysis, but stems
from a more general consideration on the scoring system
employed in the MSCEIT. Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso have
always recommended the consensus-based scoring as the best
option (e.g., [11]) claiming that this scoring system is the most
reliable. To solve the issue raised by Roberts et al. [31] regarding
the lack of convergence between expert and consensus-based
scoring of the previous version of the MSCEIT, the MEIS, it
seems as if the authors reacted by modifying the test in a way that
caused experts and consensus ratings to converge from the original
.26 of the MEIS to.98 of the current version of the MSCEIT.
Perhaps their attempt to make the two systems converge was done
at the expense of the quality of the items.
Mayer et al. ([13] p. 237) explained the high levels of
convergence by saying that ‘‘Experts look for the correct answer
by paying attention to the consensual information of the group.’’
However, as Maul also noticed [20], what the majority of people
say about emotions may simply reflect lay theories, which,
although shared by most, can still be incorrect. The ability to
spot a fake smile is a good example of this effect. Maul [20] shows
that this task is challenging for all but a restricted group of emotion
experts. In this case a ‘‘correct’’ answer should be modeled on the
few that can spot fake emotions, not on the modal answer in the
total sample. In fact, the emotional intelligent ‘prototype’ person
should be among the very few that can spot fake emotions, rather
than among the vast majority of people that get them wrong.
Thus, from a conceptual point of view, it would make more sense
to score individuals with respect to a group that by itself could be
equated with high EI individual (namely emotion experts), as long
as items reflect differences between normal individuals and those
that are higher than the norm. We suggest that these problems in
the MSCEIT may be ameliorated by choosing items that show a
certain degree of divergence (perhaps something in the middle
between .26 and .98) rather than selecting those for which experts
and general people provided almost the same answers.
Before concluding we would like to acknowledge certain
limitations of our study. An assumption of measurement models
is that correlations among items should be due only to the
common latent trait. In a recent study [24] it was suggested to
model variance in item response according to the stimulus
material, so as to account for shared variance that depends on
the structure of the test rather than on the latent trait. The idea is
that if one person judges a picture as expressing a great extent of
joy, then as a consequence this person will judge the picture as
expressing very little sadness. Thus, scores on the joy and sadness
items would depend at least in part on the interpretation of the
picture and not exclusively on the level of Emotion Perception of
the person. Maul’s recommendation certainly provides valuable
inputs for further analyses of the MSCEIT. At the same time, we
would like to raise the possibility that people may independently
perceive such emotions in the same stimulus, very much on the
line of research supporting the idea that negative and positive
emotions may coexist (e.g. [32]). Moreover, the issue of item
dependence would affect especially the Perceiving Emotions
branch of the MSCEIT and not necessarily the whole test.
It is important to notice that the results we found, in particular
those on the mismatch between difficulty of items and position of
individuals with respect to the same latent trait, as well as the
demonstration that the MSCEIT provides the most information
for levels of the latent trait corresponding to minus 1 standard
deviation, were consistently observed across the different sections
of the test. Therefore our analyses can be considered comprehen-
sive and overall informative for the overall MSCEIT.
Conclusions
Recently Maul claimed that ‘‘The central idea of measurement
is to have a procedure sensitive to differences in the thing being
measured, such that (…) different responses to different items are
reflective of different levels of emotional intelligence’’ ([20] p. 8).
Our analysis has shown that the MSCEIT’s items may capture
differences in individuals only when such individuals are
positioned at the low end of the EI trait distribution. For the
other individuals (medium and high in EI) variation in the scores
does not reflect true variation in EI. Given that most of the
evidence collected up to date on the topic of ability EI is based on
the employment of this test, and that the debate on the legitimacy
of the EI construct has often taken this test as its flagship, our
results warrant close consideration. We believe that understanding
what aspect of EI the MSCEIT measures and how it measures it is
of primary importance for advancing research in this domain.
Mayer and Salovey should be commended for having intro-
duced the theoretical bases of EI and for having brought the study
of EI on the scientific ground. We believe the domain of EI could
be enhanced by better discerning the good from the less good of
current research so as to build future theorization on solid
foundations. After all, EI is still in its early developmental stage
and it is especially at this scientific age that learning from mistakes
is vital. We hope to have provided a constructive approach to one
of the important issues surrounding EI, namely the extent to which
scholars may rely on the MSCEIT to measure EI, and that future
research will benefit from our contribution to build on the next
generation of measures of EI.
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